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drug trafficking, as forces beyond Bolivia’s borders 
shape prices, demand, and availability of cocaine. 
Almost half the cocaine paste and refined powder 
seized in Bolivia seeps in from Peru through 650 
miles of sparsely populated and monitored border. 
The Morales administration has aggressively pursued 
cocaine paste and refined cocaine, achieving record 
seizures over several years. It also staunchly opposes 
drug decriminalization or legalization. 
Peru still pursues forced eradication with U.S. fi-
nancing, and the divergence from Bolivia’s current 
orientation could not be sharper. “Forced eradica-
tion might be the catalyst that fuels violence and so-
cial conflict among the rural Quechua and mestizo 
peoples, who still suffer the trauma of the 1980’s and 
1990’s armed conflict. Criminal groups could take ad-
vantage of this situation to provoke conflict between 
the rural population, the government and the armed 
forces,” says former Peruvian drug czar, Ricardo 
Soberón. Colombia also continues to rely on forced 
eradication, including damaging aerial fumigation 
with a high human toll, continued conflict and nega-
tive environmental impact. Although Colombia forc-
ibly eradicates an average of over 100,000 hectares a 
year, its coca crop is still double that of Bolivia’s.
Increased citizenship rights for Bolivia’s growers has 
fostered unprecedented acceptance of the once-hated 
rural antidrug police (UMOPAR). “Now the military, 
UMOPAR, and the government work with the unions, 
and we have good coordination. The massacres and 
torture have come to an end,” says Marcela López of 
the Women’s Federation. 
It has become harder to find places to manufacture 
cocaine paste as well because growers fear losing their 
cato if paste operations are discovered on their land. 
Community control has “been bad for the cocaine 
business,” says the former director of the anti-drug 
police, Gonzalo Quezada. “The growers themselves 
turn in traffickers, something they never did before.” 
Brazil, now the world’s second-largest paste and 
cocaine consumer, buys almost 80% of Bolivia’s pro-
duction. The 2,000 mile border through tropical wil-
derness and isolated scrubland make control close 
to impossible. Nonetheless, in November 2012, the 
Bolivian, Brazilian, and Peruvian governments formed 
a working group to systematize control efforts and to 
address drug over-flights between their countries.
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Bolivia’s second-most important 
coca growing region, the Chapare, is 
often cast in both local and interna-
tional media as the principal hub of 
the local drug trade. Coca leaf farmers 
are described as ‘nouveau riche’ 
peasants who spend their ill-gotten 
drug gains on luxury cars, parties, and 
houses. And it is not just the press—
ex-President Jorge Quiroga recently 
accused the Chapare Agricultural 
Federations, and by extension the 
Morales government, of protecting the 
illicit trade.
Such images and myths belie the 
harsh reality of drug production and 
trafficking. Bolivia perches on the 
lowest rung of the international trade, 
mostly fabricating low-value coca 
paste (the first step in manufacturing 
cocaine) at sites scattered through-
out the country. Most drug workers 
(known as Pichicateros) are young 
men without land or much hope of 
decent jobs, not unionized Chapare 
coca growers. 
Pichicateros labor in rudimentary 
operations to soak shredded coca leaf 
in solvents that extract the cocaine 
alkaloid. The lure of fast money and 
the chance to amass enough to escape 
grinding poverty and buy a rusty old 
taxi or a patch of land is usually what 
drives them. Some become addicted 
to smoking paste cigarettes (known as 
pitillos) and find themselves trapped 
working in the trade to ensure their 
access to drugs. Their living conditions 
are poor; most of their houses are 
made of rough-cut planks without run-
ning water, sanitation, or electricity. 
They earn about $30 a day (agri-
cultural labor pays less than half that) 
for work that is tedious, irregular, and 
harmful to their health. It is also very 
risky: if caught, they face eight years 
in prison. During a research trip to the 
Chapare in October 2013 I asked a 
14 year-old pisa-coca (coca stomper) 
about his work. He described wading 
around in a toxic stew of coca, gaso-
line, and acid for several hours a day. 
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The fumes gave him a terrible head-
ache and his flimsy rubber boots let in 
acid that turned his toe nails green. 
Local coca growers worry about 
the trade’s harmful impact on their 
communities, even though local 
consumption of illicit drugs remains 
very low. In an interview carried out 
in January 2014 one woman told me: 
“Pichicata, it’s just so ugly. I want my 
son to go to university. I worry about 
him being tempted by the cash and 
pitillos.”
While previous governments 
treated the six Chapare coca grower 
federations as criminal organiza-
tions, the Morales administration 
has had considerable success in 
enlisting them as partners in the fight 
against trafficking. For eight years, the 
federations have made concerted 
efforts to tackle paste production with 
local-level union leaders, organizing 
frequent commissions to check that 
none of their members are involved. 
If a functioning or even abandoned 
production site is discovered, the 
union has the power to confiscate the 
culprit’s land and expel him or her 
from the community. The federation 
coordinates closely with the anti-drug 
police, and union members frequently 
denounce people in charge of paste 
production. The guilty ‘factory’ owner 
faces up to 15 years in prison. 
When Bolivia still adhered to the 
failed U.S. prohibitionist policies, 
pichicateros could process base paste 
close to the main roads and towns, 
safe in the knowledge that their 
neighbors were unlikely to report 
them to the authorities. U.S.-financed 
repression against growers effectively 
convinced all Chapare residents that 
the police were enemies. But this is 
no longer the case. One pichicatero 
lamented: “Before, the compas (coca 
growers) would tell you when the 
UMOPAR (anti-drug police) were com-
ing. Now they just turn you in.” 
This heightened pressure from 
within the coca-growing community 
has changed pichicatero behavior. 
They now set up production in ever 
more remote areas and rarely main-
tain an operation in one site for more 
than two weeks—lest people get 
suspicious. That the pichicateros go to 
such lengths to hide their activity from 
the coca growers provides solid evi-
dence of the Federations’ commitment 
to actively reject drug trafficking. 
While coca-cocaine represents a 
significant segment of Bolivia’s 
economy, paste producers are 
certainly not the major beneficiaries. 
But the country’s grinding poverty 
means there will always be those 
willing to assume the substantial risks 
in what is often the slim hope of 
building a better future. 
see it as a matter of national pride to be responsible 
international partners in the drug control efforts. 
“This government helped raise our awareness that 
we couldn’t grow more coca, 
not just because it is illegal, 
but also because it would give 
our country a bad interna-
tional image,” declares Yungas 
grower Juan Mamani.
Given Bolivia’s history of 
bureaucratic inefficiency, 
community control’s results 
are impressive. Faced with 
a significant funding gap in 
2013 and 2014, the concept’s 
persistence reflects growers’ 
organizational strength, trust, 
and loyalty. Yungas union leader Elias Cruz insists that 
even a year after funding stopped, “community con-
trol remains in force, not as an institution, but in the 
conscience of producers.” 
Community coca control, for all its inevitable limi-
tations, has proven more effective and cost efficient 
than forced eradication, and represents a sovereign, 
local initiative appropriate to its context. By permit-
ting farmers to grow a small amount of the product 
they rely on for economic survival, combined with 
participatory monitoring, 
improved government ser-
vices, economic development 
initiatives, and a reduction in 
violent repression, growers 
are in a better position to di-
versify their production base 
and limit their dependence 
on an illicit crop. 
“Results from a policy as 
innovative as this are not go-
ing to be immediate,” con-
tends former Chapare 
Human Rights Ombudsman, 
Godofredo Reinicke. “There will be successes and fail-
ures, ups and downs, but community control of coca 
needs to be given sufficient time to see if it makes 
sense as a sustainable approach to reducing drug-re-
lated violence.” 
Bolivian government and 
participating growers see 
it as a matter of national 
pride to be responsible 
international partners in 
the drug control efforts. 
